ChainlinkOracle
The vault's price source — an owner-curated map from token to Chainlink AggregatorV3 proxy.
contracts/src/ChainlinkOracle.sol — inherits Ownable, implements IPriceOracle.
token ⇒ AggregatorV3 proxy. Owner maps feeds from a cited source only (docs/phase-1-live.md). Unmapped tokens revert.
Storage
feedOf[token] → AggregatorV3 proxy address.
Interface
| Function | Behaviour |
|---|---|
setFeed(token, feed) | Owner. token ≠ 0. Emits FeedSet. |
price(token) → (value, decimals, updatedAt) | Reads latestRoundData(); reverts NoFeed(token) when unmapped, BadPrice(token) when the answer is ≤ 0 or updated == 0. Returns the feed's own decimals() (8 on the cited 4663 feeds). |
Deployment status
🟡 Implemented and unit-tested (ChainlinkOracle.t.sol). Not deployed on 46630 — no official Chainlink feed proxies are published for testnet, which is also why the testnet Stock Tokens stay unverified in the registry. The guarded mainnet scripts deploy it and wire the three cited feeds (NVDA, AAPL, SPY — addresses in Networks → Mainnet).
Security assumptions
- The oracle trusts the Chainlink proxies it is pointed at; feed integrity is an external dependency.
- The vault layers its own defenses on top: zero-price rejection and a 120-second default staleness bound (
StalePrice). - Owner misconfiguration (wrong feed) is a trust assumption documented in Security; feeds are only ever set from cited sources.